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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court by virtue of § 78-2-2(3)(j), U.C.A.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW,
STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
The central issue for Custom Steel is whether the trial court's denial of attorney's
fees was proper. Whether such fees are recoverable is a question of law, which is
reviewed for correctness. See 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 1999 UT 7,
120, 973 P.2d 992 (quoting Wardley Corp. v. Welsh, 962 P.2d 86, 92 (Utah Ct. App.
1998)). However, the trial court expressly articulated two sub-issues as its justification
for denying attorney fees; Custom Steel presents these two issues for this Court's review.
1. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Custom Steel, the
Intervener, is not a "party" as that term is used by § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A.
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of
law and is reviewed for correctness. See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, | 1 ,
977 P.2d 1201; Taylor ex rel CT. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, |6, 977 P.2d 479.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved when the Appellant timely filed
its Notice of Appeal in the trial court.

-1-

2. Issue: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Custom Steel, the
Intervener, did not "prevail" as required by § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A.
Standard of Review: The trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of
law and is reviewed for correctness See Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, f 1,
977 P.2d 1201; Taylor ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35,1f6, 977 P.2d 479.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved when the Appellant timely filed
its Notice of Appeal in the trial court.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

§ 78-27-56.5, U.C.A. Attorney's fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees.
A court may award costs and attorneys fees to either party that prevails
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or
other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one
party to recover attorneys fees.
History: C. 1953, 78-27-56.5, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 79, § 1.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a collection and garnishment case. However, it is somewhat complicated
because the Defendant, Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc. aka CFM ("CFM") was
dissolved and ceased all operations in 1996. CFM left no assets. As a consequence, the
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Plaintiff sought to garnish certain settlement funds ("Funds") that were being held by a
third-party, Steven C. Blevins, and which funds were contractually to be delivered by
Mr. Blevins to the attorney for the Appellant/Intervener, Custom Steel. Mr. Blevins,
however, intentionally delayed delivering those Funds to Custom Steel or its attorney.
The Plaintiffs Complaint acknowledges that CFM had no assets, and the only objective
in the Complaint was to garnish the Funds held by Mr. Blevins. Concurrent with filing
his Complaint, the Plaintiff, Mr. Anglin, obtained a prejudgment writ of garnishment. To
secure the garnishment, Mr. Blevins provided on behalf of Mr. Anglin the required
deposit of $13,300 with the trial court.
The Intervener Custom Steel properly and timely intervened in the trial court
proceedings to protect its claim for the Funds being garnished. Custom Steel prevailed in
having the garnishment order dissolved and Mr. Anglin's action dismissed with prejudice.
Mr. Anglin brought his action based on a promissory note that provided for attorney's
fees, and he sought such attorney's fees in his Complaint. Relying on § 78-27-56.5,
U.C.A., and after prevailing in dissolving the garnishment order and having the case
dismissed with prejudice, Custom Steel requested reciprocal attorney's fees at the
conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court. The trial court ruled that Custom Steel,
as an intervener, is not a "party" eligible for attorney's fees under § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A.,
and that Custom Steel did not "prevail" as intended by § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On or about September 7, 1993, CFM allegedly executed a Promissory Note in favor
of Mr. Anglin. See Complaint; (R. 4-6); Addendum 1. Mr. Anglin alleges that CFM
defaulted in the terms of the Note. See id at 2; (R. 2); Addendum 1. Mr. Anglin states
that the records of the Utah Department of Commerce reflect that CFM was voluntarily
dissolved on January 2, 1996; he also referenced and attached to his Complaint a "Notice
of Dissolution to All CFM Creditors." See id. ; Complaint at Exhibit C (R. 9); Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law; (R. 181); Addendum 1 at 2; Addendum 2 at 2. At the time
he filed his Complaint, Mr. Anglin believed that CFM had "no assets within the State of
Utah, excepting the funds being held by a third person, Mr. Steven Blevins." See
Complaint; (R. 9); Addendum 1 at 2.
In his Complaint, Mr. Anglin raised one cause of action and requested only the
following relief:
6. The Plaintiff requests a Prejudgment Writ of Garnishment directed to
Steve Blevins, Garnishee, who has possession of a fund being held
for the Defendant [CFM].
7. The Plaintiff requests judgment on its First Cause of Action for any
and all amounts remaining unpaid under the terms of the Promissory
Note, and for interest therein, including costs and attorney's fees;
and for other relief deemed just and proper.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests Judgment against the Defendant as prayed,
and for costs and attorney's fees.
Complaint (R. 2-3); Addendum 1 at 2-3.
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Mr. Anglin relied on a provision in the Promissory Note that allowed him to recover
"all costs of collection, court costs and reasonable attorneys fees . . . " See id. at
Exhibit A; (R. 4); Addendum 1 at 4.
In a prior action filed in the Third District Court, Case No. 960903449, Custom Steel
brought claims against Steven Blevins ("Blevins Action"). See Request for Hearing.
(R. 120-28); Addendum 3. In a related action to the Blevins Action, a Receiver was
appointed for dissolved CFM in Case No. 960902152, a case in which Custom Steel was
named as a defendant ("Receiver Action"). See id. at 1-2; Addendum 3. Eventually, both
the Blevins Action and the Receiver Action were consolidated and the parties entered into
a Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"). See id.
The Agreement and the Receiver's recommendations provided that a certain
receivable, originally belonging to CFM, be transferred to Mr. Blevins. See id. The
Agreement further provided that Mr. Blevins "disburse . . . 33.3% [of the receivable]
within 10 days of receipt thereof by paying by check to Custom Steel's counsel's trust
account. See id. Mr. Blevins received the receivable but he failed to deliver 1/3 of it to
counsel for Custom Steel. Rather, Mr. Blevins sent an e-mail message to Mr. Anglin six
days prior to his receipt of the receivable and encouraged Mr. Anglin to use the courts to
obtain the portion of the receivable from Mr. Blevins that was to be turned over to
counsel for Custom Steel. See Blevins E-Mail; (R. 174); Addendum 4.
In that e-mail message, Mr. Blevins clearly stated that he had already contacted an
attorney to help Mr. Anglin and that he, Mr. Blevins, would "be glad to do whatever
-5-

footwork is necessary in your behalf." See id. Mr. Blevins also offered "to pay lA of the
legal fees if unsuccessful." See id. Mr. Blevins expressed the urgency to act:
"I expect to get a check any day and then I have to disburse it within 10
days, so you need to hurry. I'm going through the documents even as I
write this. You need to call him [the attorney] tomorrow if possible. He
said he could get started Monday. Steve."
Id.
After Custom Steel intervened and after hearing, the trial court entered an order to
dissolve the garnishment. See Order on Dissolving Garnishment; (R. 149-50);
Addendum 5. The Order Dissolving the Garnishment also ordered Mr. Blevins to pay to
counsel for Custom Steel the funds being garnished. See id. Subsequent to the
garnishment being dissolved, Custom Steel moved for the trial court to dismiss
Mr. Anglin's Complaint with prejudice, to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law,
and to award attorney's fees to Custom Steel. (R. 153-54).
The trial court granted Custom Steel's motion to dismiss with prejudice and its
motion to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. See Final Order and Judgment;
(R. 184-85); Addendum 6. However, the trial court denied Custom Steel's request for
attorney'6s fees. See id. In doing, so the trial court ruled that Custom Steel, the
Intervener, is not a party that is eligible for attorney's fees as provided by § 78-27-56.5,
U.C.A., and that Custom Steel did not prevail as required by the same statute. See id.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Anglin's Complaint sought a garnishment of Funds held by his friend,
Mr. Blevins. To sustain that claim, Mr. Anglin relied on a Promissory Note which
provides for the recover to Mr. Anglin of attorney's fees. Based on the Promissory Note
and its provision for the recovery of attorney's fees, § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A., is implicated.
Custom Steel was the only party to step forward to defeat Mr. Anglin's attempt to
garnish funds belonging to Custom Steel. The only other party was Mr. Anglin, although
he never set foot in Utah during the entire proceedings in the trial court. As an
intervener, Custom Steel must be deemed a party in the action and also for the purpose of
applying the reciprocal attorney's fees statute, § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A.
Custom Steel also prevailed on every issue. It sought and prevailed in obtaining an
order dissolving the garnishment of the Funds sought by Mr. Anglin. It sought and
prevailed in obtaining a dismissal with prejudice of all claims brought by Mr. Anglin.
Mr. Anglin failed to prevail on any issue. Accordingly, Custom Steel should be deemed
the prevailing party when applying the reciprocal attorney's fees statute, § 78-27-56.5,
U.C.A.
Custom Steel, therefore, should be entitled to recover its attorney's fees just as
Mr. Anglin had sought his attorney's fees and just as the underlying Promissory Note
provides.
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ARGUMENT
Although § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A., does not define the term "party," the statute provides
for an award of attorney's fees to a "party that prevails" "based upon any promissory
note" "when the provisions of the promissory note" "allow at least one party to recover
attorney's fees." The statute in full is:
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written
contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the
provisions of the promissory note, written contract, or other writing
allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
§ 78-27-56.5, U.CA.
In interpreting § 78-27-56.5, this Court should be guided by the principle that a
statute is generally construed according to its plain language. See Moreno v. Bd. of
Education ofJordan School Dist., 926 P.2d 886, 889 (Utah 1996) ("each term in the
statute was used advisedly, thus the statutory words are read literally, unless such a
reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable"). In Moreno, this Court further stated
that "words and phrases are to be construed according to the context and the approved
usage of the language." See id. Further, "one of the cardinal principles of statutory
construction is that the courts will look to the reason, spirt, and sense of the legislation, as
indicated by the entire context and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject."
See id.
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§ 78-27-56.5 is clearly designed to provide a reciprocal arrangement for the recovery
of attorney's fees. That is, the statute is intended by its plain language to bring equity
and fairness to contracts and written agreements by giving to all parties the samerightto
recover attorney's fees, regardless of whether the writing states that only one particular
party may recover such fees. Thus, when one party drafts an agreement and makes a
provision for the drafting party to recover attorney's fees, the other party or parties should
likewise have the same opportunity. This statute equalizes therightto recover attorney's
fees for all parties to the agreement.
To qualify under the reciprocal attorney's fees statute, one must only be a party and
must prevail. In the instant case, the Promissory Note on which Mr. Anglin based his
complaint and on which he relied to obtain a prejudgment writ of garnishment contains
express language regarding Mr. Anglin'srightto recover attorney's fees. Therefore,
Custom Steel, if a party and if it prevailed, should also be entitled to recover its attorney's
fees. The trial court denied attorney's fees because it concluded that Custom Steel was
not a "party" under § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A. and had not prevailed for the purposes of
§ 78-27-56.5, U.C.A. Thus, those two issues are addressed below.
I.

Custom Steel, as an intervener, was a "party" because it was the only active
party other than the Plaintiff, Mr. Anglin.
In the proceedings below, there were only two named parties: Mr. Anglin as the

Plaintiff and CFM as the Defendant. However, CFM was dissolved, had no assets, no
employees, no operations, and no representation. See Complaint; (R. 4-6); Addendum I.
-9-

In effect, CFM would not and could not present any defense against Mr. Anglin's
Complaint. In bringing his Complaint, Mr. Anglin recognized and acknowledged that
CFM was dissolved and had no assets. See id. For all practical purposes, CFM is and
was what is commonly referred to as judgment proof.
Mr. Anglin obviously knew that CFM could not mount a defense, since CFM had no
assets to pay for legal fees nor anyone to hire an attorney to represent CFM. Moreover,
CFM had no incentive to defend against Mr. Anglin's claims; CFM had nothing to lose
and nothing to gain. Mr. Anglin brought his Complaint for the express purpose of
garnishing that part of the receivable which Mr. Blevins held and was soon to be turned
over to counsel for Custom Steel, i.e., the Funds. See id. The Funds were part of a
Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement") between Custom Steel, its related parties,
and Mr. Blevins. (R. 126); Addendum 3. Mr. Blevins knew that he was to turnover those
Funds to Custom Steel's attorney within ten days after receipt. See E-Mail; Addendum 4.
However, Mr. Blevins encouraged Mr. Anglin to bring the instant action to garnish
the Funds soon to be in the possession of Mr. Blevins. In response, Mr. Anglin filed his
Complaint and immediately obtained a prejudgment writ of garnishment. (R. 12-14).
Given the foregoing facts, it is clear that Mr. Anglin's lawsuit was commenced solely
for the purpose of obtaining the Funds held by Mr. Blevins. In effect, Mr. Anglin used
the Promissory Note as the contractual basis for garnishing the Funds. Further,
Mr. Anglin sought in his Complaint attorney's fees, costs, and interest as follows:
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6. The Plaintiff requests a Prejudgment Writ of Garnishment directed to
Steve Blevins, Garnishee, who has possession of a fund being held
for the Defendant [CFM].
7. The Plaintiff requests judgment on its First Cause of Action for any
and all amounts remaining unpaid under the terms of the Promissory
Note, and for interest therein, including costs and attorney's fees;
and for other relief deemed just and proper.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests Judgment against the Defendant as prayed,
and for costs and attorney's fees.
Complaint (R. 2-3); Addendum 1 at 2-3.
Custom Steel timely and properly intervened to protect its interest in the Funds being
held by Mr. Blevins. See Addendum 3. The Court allowed and acknowledged the
presence of Custom Steel as an intervener and granted Custom Steel's objections to the
garnishment. See Order on Dissolving Garnishment; (R. 149-52); Addendum 5. Other
than Mr. Anglin and Custom Steel, no other parties participated in the trial court. Custom
Steel vigorously defended against the garnishment efforts of Mr. Anglin. Accordingly,
Custom Steel should be considered a party. See 59 Am Jur 2d PARTIES at § 170 (by the
very definition of intervention the intervener is a party to the action and is as much a
party to the action as the original parties).
II. Custom Steel, as an intervener, prevailed in defeating Mr. Anglin's claims and
the relief he sought.
la Mountain States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 776 P.2d 643, 648 (Utah Ct. App.
1989), the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of "prevailing party" for the purpose
of awarding attorney's fees. That Court stated:
-11-

Typically, determining the "prevailing party" for purposes of
awarding fees and costs is quite simple. Plaintiff sues defendant for
money damages; if plaintiff is awarded a judgment, plaintiff has
prevailed, and if defendant successfully defends and avoids an adverse
judgment, defendant has prevailed.... See also Checketts v. Collinqs,
78 Utah 93, 1 P.2d 950, 953 (Utah 1931) ("There can be but one
prevailing party in an action at law to recover a money judgment.").
We hold that in the present circumstances the party in whose favor the
"net" judgment is entered must be considered the "prevailing party" and
is entitled to an award of its fees. See, e.g., Ocean West Contractors,
Inc. v. Halec Constr. Co., 123 Ariz. 470, 600 P.2d 1102, 1105 (1979);
Trollope v. Koerner, 21 Ariz. App. 43, 515 P.2d 340, 344 (1973); Moss
Constr. Co. v. Wulffsohn, 116 Cal. App. 2d 203, 253 P.2d 483, 485
(1953); Szoboszlayv. Glessner, 233 Kan. 475, 664 P.2d 1327, 1333-35
(1983); E.C.A. Envtl. Management Servs., Inc. v. Toenyes, 208 Mont.
336, 679 P.2d 213, 218 (1984). . .
Mountain States Broadcasting, 776 P.2d at 648 {some citations omitted).
The Tenth Circuit reviewed "prevailing party" as it relates to § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A.
See In Re Ellison v. Ellison, 94-4211 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 22117 (D.C. Utah
1995)(unpublished). In Ellison, Ellison contended that because First Security recovered
substantially less that its total claim, that he was the prevailing party." See id. In
analyzing the issue of who was the prevailing party, the Tenth Circuit cited Highland
Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981)("a party in whose favor an
affirmative judgment is rendered, whether or not the judgment is for less than initially
sought in the complaint, is the 'prevailing partyM,).
There is no doubt that Custom Steel prevailed in this action. Mr. Anglin's claims
were dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Angling's writ of garnishment was dissolved and the
Funds he sought from Mr. Blevins were turned over to counsel for Custom Steel. Custom
-12-

Steel prevailed at every hearing and on every issue in the trial court, except when it
requested attorney's fees under the reciprocal attorney's fee statute at issue in this appeal.
The trial court may have thought that Custom Steel prevailed on the garnishment
issue and in dismissing Mr. Anglin's claims but that it did not prevail on defeating
Mr. Anglin's claim that the defendant CFM was not in default. However, that issue was
not the issue litigated by Mr. Anglin.1 Rather, the only issue litigated by Mr. Anglin was
the garnishment matter. That was the only subject matter of this action in the trial court.
Moreover, Mr. Anglin's Complaint clearly stated that the only relief sought was the
garnishment and the Funds held by Mr. Blevins. See Complaint (R. 2-3); Addendum 1.
Mr. Anglin did not prevail on any issue. Custom Steel prevailed on every issue. It
should be clear and obvious that Custom Steel was the "prevailing party." Since the
Promissory Note on which Mr. Anglin was able to obtain a prejudgment writ of
garnishment and which allowed Mr. Anglin to recover attorney's fees, the Promissory
Note fits well within § 78-27-56.5, U.C.A. Custom Steel defeated Mr. Anglin's attempt
to garnish the Funds held by Mr. Blevins while Mr. Anglin was attempting to enforce the
terms of the Note. Accordingly, Custom Steel prevailed against Mr. Anglin's
enforcement of the Note. If Mr. Anglin had been successful in obtaining the Funds, he
would have sought his attorney's fees, even though he may not have been able to collect

1

Mr. Anglin never appeared in the trial court proceedings and was at all times
represented by an attorney. Mr. Anglin's attorney withdrew on the day he received
Custom Steel's Notice of Appeal. Thereafter, Mr. Anglin has apparently been pro se,
although no communication has been receivedfromhim since this appeal began.
-13-

themfromCFM, a dissolved corporation with no assets and no operations. Likewise,
Custom Steel should be allowed to recover its attorney's fees in defeating Mr. Anglin's
attempts to take the Funds which rightfully belonged in total or in part to Custom Steel.

CONCLUSION
Custom Steel prevailed on every issue. It was the only party participating in the
proceedings except for Mr. Anglin. Custom Steel is surely a party. Without Custom
Steel, there would have been no defense against Mr. Anglin's attempt to garnish the
Funds held by Mr. Blevins. Custom Steel presented the only defense. Moreover, Custom
Steel was the only prevailing party and should be considered so under § 78-27-56.5 since
the underlying writing on which Mr. Anglin commenced this action allowed Mr. Anglin
to recover his attorney's fees.
Custom Steel requests this Court to reverse the trial court and remand for a
determination of attorney's fees. Custom Steel also requests its attorney's fees in
bringing this appeal.

DATED this 28th day of June 2000.

Michael A. Jensen (7231)
Counsel for InterveneTCustom Steel

Custom2\Anglin\Appeal\Brief June 28,2000
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Custom2\Anglin\Appeal\Brief June 28,2000

-15

ADDENDUM INDEX
Addendum 1

COMPLAINT with Exhibits

Addendum 2

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Addendum 3

CUSTOM STEEL'S REQUEST FOR HEARING (Garnishment
Proceeding) with Global Settlement Agreement

Addendum 4

E-MAIL MESSAGEfromMr. Blevins to Mr. Anglin

Addendum 5

ORDER ON DISSOLVING GARNISHMENT

Addendum 6

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Custom2\Anglin\Appeal\Brief June 28,2000

-16

Tabl

Joseph J. Huggins #3809
Attorney for Plaintiff
243 East 400 South

Metro Place, Suite #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 532-3020 (Telephone)
(801) 531-7928 (Facsimile)
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

MARK ANGLIN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

C O M P L A I N T

CONTRACTING FABRICATION
MACHINING, INC.,
aka CFM, INC.,
Defendant.

C i v i l No. <Ho<?//0'7^~
Jud

"

&/L&M

Plaintiff, through counsel, complains against the Defendant,
and alleges as follows:
JURISDICTION AND PARTIES
1.

The Plaintiff is an individual, currently resident of the

State of Colorado, but at all times herein, doing business in the
state of Utah. The Defendant is now a dissolved Utah Corporation,
at all times herein having its principal place of business in Salt
Lake County, Utah. The business dealings between the parties took
place in Salt Lake County, Utah.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
2.

On September 7, 1993, Plaintiff loaned the Defendant

$10,000.00 in return for the Defendant's "Promissory Note and
Security Agreement", attached hereto as Exhibit A.

00001

3.

The

Defendant

has

defaulted

in

the

terms

of

the

Promissory Note, and has made no payment since 9-19-94, when it
paid the Plaintiff the sum of $400.00, drawn no its Bank One,
Trolley Square Branch account.

The said payment was returned to

Plaintiff for "INSUFFICIENT FUNDS", and the payment has never
cleared.
4.

See Exhibit B attached hereto.
According to the Records of the Utah State Department of

Commerce, the Defendant corporation was voluntarily dissolved on
January 2, 1996, and is no longer doing business in the state of
Utah.

The Department of Commerce shows the existing registered

agent as Randall Isaacson, 8 East Broadway, #735, Salt Lake City,
Utah, 84111, but there is no Randall Isaacson at this address. Mr.
Isaacson was the President of the Defendant corporation, and he
also

personally

guaranteed

the

obligation

to

the

Plaintiff.

However, Mr. Isaacson has filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, and moved
from the State of Utah.
5.

It is believe that Defendant has no assets within the

State of Utah, excepting the funds being held by a third person,
Mr. Steve Blevins, for the benefit of the Defendant.

See attached

Exhibit C, Notice of Dissolution.
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
6.

The Plaintiff requests a Prejudgment Writ of Garnishment

directed to Steve Blevins, Garnishee, who has possession of a fund
being held for the Defendant.
7.

The Plaintiff requests judgment on its First Cause of

Action for any and all amounts remaining unpaid under the terms of
2
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the Promissory Note, and for interest therein, including costs and
attorney's fees; and for other relief deemed just and proper,
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff

requests

Judgment

against the

Defendant as prayed^and
id^and for
for costs
costs and
and attorney's
a t t o r n e y ' s fees,
fees.
Dated this

Joseph J . Jiuggirfe
/Jiuggiire
Attorney / o r P l a i n t i f f

/
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Promhji'j Notf and Stcwity Agreement
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned BOKKOWtfR(S), Jointly 4nd
severally, premise to pay t^ trt GV+:-L of ft|AR[-4 AWy^/jI
("LENDER"), pay©*, or ita order, at its
0«fic* at :<R?&fi«\MtU.Q
fjlttit VAUL&&£&:
, ov auch other
place as the holder may designate, the sum of $ /Qfir\n
(consisting of the elements shown below) payable in successive
monthly installments as provided in the Schedule of Installment
Payments appearing below, the first payment to become due on , and
subsequent payments to become due on the same day 0 4 each month
thereafter until the full amount of this note is Vaid, with
interest at the highest rate lawful after maturity, together with
all costs of collection, court costs and reasonable attorneys face
and without relief from valuation and aDpralaement laws. The
PERCENTAGE R A T E is _ ^ _*,
monthly.
If any installment is not paid within five (5) days after the
same shall become due, a late charge of Five Percent (5%) of each
suoh installment shall bo payable to the holder at that time.
Upon the happening of any of the following events, the holder
may, at its option, forthwith accelerate the maturity, and the
entire unpaid balance hereof shall thereupon immediately become due
and payable without demand or notice, and the holder shall have the
rights and remedies of a secured party under the Utah U.C.C.,
namely: (a) failure to pay any installment hereunder when due;
(b) failure of performance of any obligation of the undersigned to
the holder; (c) death or dissolution of the undersigned; (d) if
the undersigned or any endorser, accommodation party, guarantor or
surety of this note shall become Insolvent, make a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors, or if any proceeding of
any nature under the Federal Bankruptcy Act, as amended, or under
any state insolvency law, be commenced by or against any Of them,
or a receiver be appointed for or a writ or order of attaohment or
garnishment be issued or made against any of the property, assets
or income of any of them; (e) it the holder hereof shall deem
himself insecure.
The undersigned and all endorsers, accommodation parties,
guarantors and sureties hereof, jointly and severally waive
presentment for payment, notice of dishonor and demand, notice of
non-payment, notice of protest and protest of this note, and all
other notices and demands required by law, and consent to any and
all extensions of time or modifications that may be granted with
respect to the payment or other provisions of this note, and to the
release of any collateral or other security, or any part thereof,
and agree that additional makers, endorsers, accommodation parties,
guarantors or sureties may becoraa parties hereto without notice to
them and without affecting their liability hereunder and further
agree that it shall not be necessary for the holder to resort to
legal remedies against any of them before proceeding against any
other of them, and that no release of one or more of the makersp

endorsers, accommodation parties, guarantors or sureties,, whether
by operation of law or by any act of the holder of this note, shall
release any other maker, accommodation party, endorser, guarantor
Or surety*
This note evidences a loan by the payer to the undersigned for
the purchase by the undersigned of the Property, as described on
attached Exhibit "A", and the undersigned does hereby grant to the
payee, its successors and assigns, and any holder of this note, A
purchase money security interact in **id Property, together with
all additions and accessions thereto, and all products and proceeds
thereof, and, in addition, a security interest in all equipment,
inventory, accounts, accounts receivable, and all other personal
property belonging to the BORROWER(S), now owned or hereafter
acauired. toaether wi_th * ] _ ! nroduCtS 2nd n rOC5Sd2 thSISCf SS
security for the navment of this note. The aecurirv inr*™*.*-*

^ - .
Q Q (j (} 4

Upon \
sale of any item described on attacneu EKhiDlt "A",
the proceeds of such sale shall be paid to the holder of this note
and applied againat the installments to be paid hereunder in
reverse order beginning with the last installment.
BORRGWER(S)
hereby grant(a) to LENDER the exclusive right to collect from the
purchaser of any such item sold the purchase price thereof. To the
extent LBNQBtt allows BORBOWER(S) to collect such sums directly,
however, BQRRQWER(S) shall acquire no title to such sums, but shall
hold then as L E N D E R ' S trustee.

This note may be on© of a series of notes from the undersigned
to the payee.
Upon default of any note in this series, the
remaining notes shall, at the option of the holder and without
demand or notice to the undersigned, become immediately due and
payable•

The loan evidenced by this note is made in the Stato of Utah.
This note shall be governed and construed under the laws of the
State of Utah* Any action for enforcement or interpretation hereof
must be brought, if at ail, in the courts of Salt Lake County,
Utah.
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CONTRACTING FABRICATION MACHINING, Inc.

2630 South 3270 West 974-0057 Salt Lake City, U T 84119
590

PAY.

Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

THE

S U . ' • ' 4 O O •:>•:< •>' OC|N$UFFICIENTFUNDS

97-154/1240

TO
THE
ORDER

Mark ZSnglin

INSUFFICIENT FUNDS

OF

<U 3 27 378811'
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SPIOOO CARBONLESS I C SECURITY PRINTERS. INC.
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DANNY QUINTANA &r ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
Judge Building, Suite 735
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DANNY QUINTANA
DAVID W GEARY

(801) 363-7726
Fax (801) 521-4625

Notice of Dissolution to All CFM Creditors
To Whom It May Concern:

A*t &*

Please be advised that Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc. is no longer in
business and has been formally dissolved. The date of Dissolution is December 30, 1995. If
you have a outstanding claim against the company please send your notice tc:
Danny Quintana
Danny Quintana & Associates, P.C.
8 East Broadway, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Please include in your notice of claim the amount owed, the date the obligation was
incurred and a copy of any written agreement. Unless your claim is sooner barred by any
State Statute limiting actions, you have 120 days from the receipt of this Notice of
Dissolution to file a claim. Any claim received after 120 days will not be honored. If you
have any questions or need more information please call Danny Quintana at (801) 363-7726
or send written correspondence to the above address.

Dann\
RegistSred-Agent)for CFM, Inc.

Tab 2

M I C H A E L A. JENSEN (7231)

Filed & Served 12/24/99

Attorney at Law
s
8
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« « • wwweT COURT

136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

ju(jiCiai District

lhM

JAN 3 1 2000
8MTUKKCOUNTY

Counsel for Intervener
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Third District Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7507/7027 (Melba/Brandi) W42

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

MARKANGLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 990911095
CONTRACTING FABRICATION
MACHINING, INC. aka CFM, INC.,
Defendant.

Judge William B. Bohling
1

The Court, having reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties on objections to
the writ of garnishment and after hearing on December 6, 1999, at which the Plaintiff was
represented by his counsel of record, Joseph J. Huggins, and the Defendant was
represented by its counsel of record, Michael A. Jensen, the Court enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Plaintiff commenced this action based on a collection claim on a

promissory note dated September 7, 1993, and executed by Randy Isaacson.
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2.

At the time the Plaintiff filed this action, his claim was unsecured as evidenced

by the Plaintiffs affidavit.
3.

The Defendant, Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc. ("CFM"), was

dissolved in January 1996, and has no known assets.
4.

CFM possessed at one time two accounts receivable, one of which was paid

into the Court. The second account receivable was from Clean Gas, and this Court
entered an order which transferred the Clean Gas Receivable to Steven C. Blevins and his
wife as recommended by the Receiver for CFM.
5.

The account receivable which was paid into the Court was also transferred to

Steven C. Blevins and his wife, after certain expenses were deducted for the Receiver and
his attorney.
6.

The net effect of these transfers is to remove such accounts receivable from the

possession and/or control of CFM and to transfer all control and possession of them to
Mr. and Mrs. Blevins.
7.

CFM was not a plaintiff in any action in this court involving claims for the

Clean Gas Receivable, nor has CFM made any claims against Mr. or Mrs. Blevins, in this
Court or in any court, which seeks damages or monetary payment form the Blevinses.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Plaintiffs claims procedurally must be prosecuted in the Receivership
Action in order to provide equal treatment to all unsecured creditors as required by law.

-2-
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2.

The Plaintiff failed to timely move the Court to reopen the Receivership Action

and has therefore lost that opportunity to have his claim considered by the Receiver for
CFM.
3.

Since the Clean Gas Receivable was transferred in its entirety to Mr. and Mrs.

Blevins, any funds collected by the Blevinses from that Clean Gas Receivable is void of
any CFM ownership or interests in such collected funds. In effect, any interest which
CFM may have had in the Clean Gas Receivable was terminated when the Receivable
was transferred to the Blevinses.

DATED this 3\

day of January 2000.

Judge William B. Bohling
Third District Court Judge

Approved as to form:

Joseph J. Huggins
Attorney for the Plaintiff

DATED this 24th day of December 1999.

Michael A. Jensen I
Attorney for Intervener
Custom\Anglin\Motion2 Dismiss plus December 24,1999

3-
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Tab 3

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)

Filed & Served 11/29/99

Attorney at Law

Kearns Building, Suite 300
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

3ha&&4jJ$

Counsel for Intervener
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Third District Clerk; 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7507/7027 (Melba/Brandi) W42

REQUEST FOR HEARING
(Garnishment Proceeding)

MARK ANGLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 990911095
CONTRACTING FABRICATION
MACHINING, INC. aka CFM, INC.,

Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.

Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc. ("Custom") hereby makes a timely request for
hearing, pursuant to Rule 64D(h), Utah R. Civ. P., to challenge the writ of garnishment
served on garnishee Steven C. Blevins. This request is based on the following reasons:
1. The Answers to Interrogatories furnished by Mr. Blevins are inaccurate because
the funds ("Funds") being held by Mr. Blevins are not and never were intended for CFM,
the Defendant herein, nor for the benefit of CFM. In effect, CFM has no legal or
equitable title to such Funds.
2.

The Funds belong to the plaintiffs in a related action, Case No. 960903449

("Blevins Action"), a case brought against Mr. Blevins, and which case was settled as
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part of a Global Settlement Agreement ("Agreement"), copy is attached hereto as
Exhibit A. The plaintiffs in that case include Custom, the requester herein.
3.

The Agreement expressly intends that
In consideration of settlement and dismissal of the [Blevins Action]
and as inducement to Drabner and the Receiver to wind up the affairs of
CFM in accordance with the terms of this global settlement, the Blevins
shall perform and/or pay, and the Isaacsons1 shall perform and/or pay, as
follows:
The Blevins shall disburse the . . . 33.3% within 10 days of receipt thereof
by paying by check to the Isaacsons' counsel's trust account.
See Agreement at 3 ^f 3.2, Exhibit A.

4.

Custom was one of three plaintiffs in the Blevins Action and is, along with the

other two plaintiffs, entitled to 100% of the Funds being garnished. CFM was not a party
to the Blevins Action nor to another related action, Case No. 960902152 ("Receiver
Action"), a case which was the subject of a lengthy Receivership proceeding that was
concluded in July 1999 as part of the Agreement. CFM made no claims against any party
and was not entitled to any proceeds from the settlement. On the other hand, Custom
made claims to the Receiver against CFM's estate, but such claims were never paid
except through the Agreement which settled both the Receiver Action and the Blevins
Action.

1

The term "Isaacsons" was used to refer to all parties except for the Blevins and Drabner, the
plaintiff in the Receiver Action The parties included in the grouping Isaacsons, are Custom, Heidi Bishop,
Jason Bishop, Wendy Garamendi, Mark Garamendi, Randy Isaacson, Linda Isaacson, and CFM

-2-

0

Accordingly, Custom requests a hearing on the writ of garnishment, objects entirely
to the writ of garnishment, and requests that the garnishment be terminated so that the
Funds being held by Mr. Blevins may be paid as directed by the terms of the Agreement.

DATED this 29th day of November 1999.

^flAtA
Michael A. Jensen
Attorney for CustonVSteel

Custom\Anghn\Request Hearing on Garnishment November 29, 1999
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Global Settlement Agreement
Steven Blcvins ("SBIevins") and Debra Kay Blevins ("DBlevins") (together the "Blevins")
Robert D. Drabner ("Drabner"), Paul Beard ("Beard" or the "Receiver"), and Custom Steel
Fabrication, Inc. ("CSFI"), Contracting Fabrication Machining, Inc., a Utah corporation ("CFM"),
Randy Isaacson ("RIsaacson"), Linda I. Isaacson ("LIsaacson"), Heidi Bishop ("HBishop"), Jason
Bishop ("JBishop"), Wendy Garamendi ("WGaramendi"), and Mark Garamendi ("MGaramendi")
(together the "Isaacsons"), in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions contained
herein, and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are
hereby acknowledged, hereby stipulate and agree as hereinafter set forth.
1.0

The Recitals.

1.1
CFM and RIsaacson previously borrowed approximately $60,000 from the Blevins,
secured by CFNfs non-real-property assets and certain realty owned by LIsaacson, and
guaranteed by RIsaacson (the "Debt).
1.2
LIsaacson filed suit in Box Elder County, Brigham City Department, District Court in
Case No. 950000074-PR to enjoin the foreclosure sale of her real property (the "Brigham City
Proceeding"). Tne Blevins counterclaimed and brought a third party complaint against CFM and
RIsaacson therein, seeking judgment on the Debt. The Blevins obtained summary judgment
against CFM and RIsaacson on the Debt, and LIsaacson's restraining order was lifted, whereupon
the Blevins foreclosed upon LIsaacson's real property. The Blevins docketed that summary
judgment in Davis County, Farmington Department, District Court, as Case No. 956703286-AJ
(the "Davis Collection"), and in Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, District Court, as Case
No. 956926130-AJ (the "Salt Lake Collection"). The Blevins also had the summary judgment
in the Brigham City Proceeding docketed in New York.
1.3
RIsaacson and Drabner had previously been the shareholders of CFM, and had executed
articles of dissolution and an agreement of dissolution for CFM.
1.4
RIsaacson and LIsaacson filed, at various times, Chapter 13 cases in United States
Bankruptcy Court. Those cases were all converted to Chapter 7 and ordered administered jointly
by trustee Stephen Rupp (the "Trustee") under Case No. 96B-20981 (the "Bankruptcy Case").
In the Bankruptcy Case, the Isaacsons claimed that assets of CFM had passed to RIsaacson and
thus were part of RIsaacson's and LIsaacson's bankruptcy estate.
1.5
The Blevins in the Salt Lake Collection and in New York had garnishments issued against
several of CFM's accounts receivable and had a writ of execution issued against and had seized
by the constable CFM"s tangible personalty. The Isaacsons have claimed that some of the items
seized by the constable pursuant to the execution were assets of CSFI.
1.6
CSFI, HBishop and MGaramendi filed suit against SBlevins and others in Salt Lake
County, Salt Lake Department, District Court, as Case No. 960903449-CV, alleging interference
with contract, trespass, and assault, among other claims (the "CSFI Proceeding").
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1.7
Drabner filed suit against RIsaacson, CFM, and others seeking appointment of a receiver
for CFM, among other relief, in Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department, District Court, as Case
No. 960902152-CV (the "Receivership Proceeding"). Beard was duly appointed as Receiver in
the Receivership Proceeding, and a restraining order issued.
1.8
All parties, save the Isaacsons, maintain that all assets held by the Receiver or subject to
the restraining order issued in the Receivership Proceeding and/or held or claimed by CSFI arc
the assets of CFM. The Isaacsons maintain that all or part of those assets are the separate
property of CSFI.
1.9
The Parties hereto have reached a settlement of all claims by, between, and among them,
and desire hereby to reduce that settlement to writing.
2.0

The Receivership Proceeding.

The Parties hereto have agreed that the Receiver shall issue a final report and give notice
thereof to parties-in-interest as required by the Court and by applicable law. Drabner, the
Isaacsons, and the Blevins have agreed not to object to winding up CFM's affairs via this final
report, subject to the provisions of this Agreement. In general, the Agreement calls for certain
assets to be disbursed either to the Blevins or CFM and/or CSFI, for the Receiver and his counsel
to be discharged and the affairs of CFM wound up, and all lawsuits to be dismissed and claims
to be forever waived, all as set forth hereafter. A true and correct copy of the Receiver's Final
Report is attached as Exhibit "A".
3.0

The Settlement.

3.1
The Personalty in Storage. Certain tangible personal property, belonging either to CFM
or CSFI, but in which the Blevins claim a primed, properly perfected security interest, were
seized pursuant to the execution referred to above. Most of this property remains in storage with
A-1 Moving & Storage (the "Tangible Personalty"). The remainder of this property, constituting
several boxes of documents and records and miscellaneous items, were removed by the Receiver
and his Counsel and are in the possession of the Receiver (the "Records"). The Records and the
Tangible Personalty shall be abandoned to CFM and/or CSFI, since the cost of administration
may exceed the costs of seizure and storage, making them of negligible value to the Receiver,
and the Blevins hold a primed security interest therein. The Isaacsons, however, shall be solely
responsible for all costs of seizure, removal, storage, and retrieval of such personalty, and agree,
jointly and severally, that they shall defend and hold harmless the Blevins and their counsel, the
Receiver and his counsel, and Drabner and his counsel, from any and all claims by the constable
and storage company in connection with the said personalty, except as follows:
3.1.a. The Blevins shall contribute the greater of $2,000 and 20% of the costs to
satisfy the constable and A-1 Moving and Storage; $2,000 shall be disbursed to the
constable and/or A-1 Moving and Storage upon the later of execution hereof by all the
parties hereto and approval by the Court of the Receiver's Final Report.
2
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3.1.b. The Blevins, the Receiver and his counsel, Drabner and his counsel, make
no warranty as to title to the Personalty.
32
Consideration for Dismissal of CSFI Proceeding, Etc. In consideration of settlement
and dismissal of the CSFI Proceeding and as inducement to Drabner and the Receiver to wind
up the affairs of CFM in accordance with the terms of this global settlement, the Blevins shall
perform and/or pay, and the Isaacsons shall perform and/or pay, as follows:
3.2.a. The Blevins shall pay to the Isaacsons by deliver}7 of a check to the
Isaacsons' counsel's trust account the difference between $2,000 and 20% (referred to in
§ 3.1,a., above) within 10 days of receipt of the constable's and/or A - l Moving and
Storage's invoice and proof of payment.
3.2.b. The Blevins shall pay to the Isaacsons 33.3% of the net proceeds of the
Clean Gas Receivable. The net proceeds shall be net of all attorney's fees and costs
incurred (whether by the Blevins or the Receiver) in pursuing and preserving this
receivable, which the Blevins agree to pursue with all due diligence. The Isaacsons
delegate to the Blevins and their counsel full authority to settle the claim upon the Clean
Gas Receivable upon such terms as they, in their best business judgment, determine to
be fair and reasonable, and hereby agree to defend and hold harmless the Blevins against
any claims, counterclaims, competing claims or offsets by Clean Gas and/or any other
person. The Blevins shall disburse the Isaacsons' 33.3% within 10 days of receipt thereof
by paying by check to the Isaacsons' counsel's trust account.
3.2.C. LIsaacson shall direct her counsel in the Brigham City Proceeding, who
hold in their trust account the cash proceeds of the cash bond posted by her, to pay
forthwith to the Trustee (and not pending approval by the Bankruptcy Court) all net
proceeds of the cash bond pursuant to their agreement with the Trustee. A form of
demand, which LIsaacson shall execute and deliver to her counsel upon approval by the
Court of the Receiver's Final Report, is attached as Exhibit "B".
33
Other Assets. The Receiver shall convey to the Blevins the net proceeds of the funds
presently on deposit with the Court in the Receivership Proceeding, as well as that account
receivable of CFM owed by Clean Gas (the "Clean Gas Receivable"), and any and all claims to
assets of the Isaacsons1 Bankruptcy Estate. The net proceeds shall be net of all reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred.
3.4

Waiver of Claims/Full Satisfaction.
3.4.a. The Isaacsons, their heirs, agents and assigns, hereby accept the
consideration they are to receive hereunder in full satisfaction of all claims, and further
withdraw (to the extent they have any), and forever waive, any and all claims, whenever
incurred against RIsaacson's and LIsaacson's bankruptcy estate(s), Drabner (his heirs,
agents and assigns), the Receiver (his heirs, agents and assigns), the assets of CFM and/or
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CSFI identified in §§ 3.1 - 3.3, above, and the Blevins, their heirs, agents and assigns,
except as specifically set forth in this Agreement.
3.4.b. The Blevins, theirs heirs, agents and assigns, hereby accept the
consideration they are to receive hereunder in full satisfaction of all claims, and further
withdraw (to the extent they have any), and forever waive, any and all claims, whenever
incurred, against the Isaacsons, Drabner and the Receiver, their heirs, agents, and assigns,
except as specifically set forth in this Agreement.
3.4.C. Drabner, his heirs, agents and assigns, hereby withdraws (to the extent h c ^ - T ^
has any), and forever waives, any and ail claims, whenever incurred, against t h e ^ * ^ ^
Isaacsons, the Receiver and the Blevins, their heirs, agents, and assigns, except as
specifically set forth in this Agreement, and further consents to entry of orders approving
the Receiver's Final Report and approving this Agreement, conditioned upon the approval
by the Court of the Receiver's Final Report.
3.4.d. The Receiver, his heirs, agents and assigns, hereby withdraws (to the extent
he has any), and forever waives, any and all claims, whenever incurred, against the
Isaacsons, Drabner and the Blevins, their heirs, agents, and assigns, except as specifically
set forth in this Agreement, and further consents to entry of orders approving the
Receiver's Final Report and approving this Agreement, conditioned upon the approval by
the Court of the Receiver's Final Report.
4.0

Dismissal of the CSFI Proceeding.

Upon approval of the Receiver's Final Report by the Court, the Isaacsons shall execute
and/or cause to be executed on their behalf, a dismissal with prejudice of the CSFI Proceeding,
pursuant to the Stipulated Order of Dismissal, a true and correct copy of which is attached as
Exhibit " C .
5.0

Miscellaneous.

5.1.
Utah law shall apply in any construction and/or interpretation of the terms of this
Agreement, and the Courts of Salt Lake County, Utah, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any
proceeding arising herefrom.
5.2.
In the event of any breach hereof, the non-breaching and/or prevailing party shall be
entitled to recover his attorney's fees and costs, with or without the commencement of a court
proceeding, before or after trial, and/or in the event of any appeal.
5.3.
Tne headings hereof are for convenience only, and shall not be relied upon for
interpretation of any provision hereof.
5.4.
The covenants and conditions hereof shall inure to the benefit of the heirs and assigns of
the parties hereto.
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5.5. In the event a party is determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction to be entitled to
injunctive relief, the requirement that the party post bond is hereby waived.
5.6. No waiver of performance in one instance shall be construed to be a waiver of all future
such performances.
5.7. In the event any provision hereof is determined to be unenforceable for any reason, the
remaining provisions shall remain enforceable.
5.8. This is the Parties' entire agreement. No prior representations or statements have any
force or effect, but are merged herein. No modification of any term hereof shall be enforceable
unless made in writing, signed by all Parties hereto, and supported by adequate consideration.
5.9. This Agreement shall be effective upon the later of execution by all the parties hereto,
and approval as to form by their several counsel, and approval by the Court of the Receiver's
Final Report.
5.10. This Agreement shall be effective if executed, at the parties1 convenience, with duplicate
and/or facsimile copy signature pages.
DATED February

, 1999.
THE BLEVINS:

2!fc^4W^,
Steven Blevins
Debra Kay BlevinT
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Ronald L. Dunn, Esq.
Attorney for Blevins
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Tab 4

CFM debt
mailbox /C%7C/NETSCAPE/mail/Sen 8061448 5A7F@sisna com&numbe
Subject: CFM debt
Date: Thu, 14 Oct 1999 11 35 04 -0600
From: Steve Blevins <blcvins@sisna corrr
To: ro|0_marK@hotmail com
Mark, this may turn out to be very good news and wish I had thought of
it earlier CFM has some money coming to them through my hands from our
settlement. It looks like about $6000+ I called an attorney today who
went against CFM for another creditor He said he would be w/JIing to
handle the case, and he is one of the most competent business lawyers I
saw operate His name is Chris Schmutz, 801-364 0256 265 E 100 S SLC,
UT hie sa/d it would coot about $400-500 for the first round o\
documents to get seize the money and get judgments Probably another
$500 to finish I believe I have most of the documents here he would
need, and I will be glad to do whatever footwork is necessary in your
behaif.
I would be willing to pay 1/2 of the legal fees if unsuccessful I
expoct to get a check any day and then I have to disburse it within 10
days, so you need to hurry. I'm going through the documents even as I
write this You need to call him tomorrow if possible, he said he could
get started Monday. Steve
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Tab 5

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law

R119 ilSTHICT COURT

Kearns Building, Suite 300
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

Third Judicial District

DEC 16 1999
SALTL^^TY
Deputy Clerk

Counsel for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

450 South State Street
PO Box I860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Third District Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7507/7027 (Melba/Becki) W42

MARKANGLIN,
|

ORDER ON DISSOLVING
GARNISHMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
CONTRACTING FABRICATION
MACHINING, INC. aka CFM, INC.,

Case No. 990911095
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.

The Court, having reviewed memoranda submitted by the parties on objections to
the writ of garnishment and after hearing on December 6, 1999, at which the Plaintiff was
represented by his counsel of record, Joseph J. Huggins, and the Defendant was
represented by its counsel of record, Michael A. Jensen, the Court orders and
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the garnishment in this action be dissolved and that
Mr. Blevins pay the funds garnished in this action to Michael A. Jensen, Attorney Client
Trust Account, as required by the Global Settlement Agreement, and that Mr. Blevins
make such payment to Mr. Jensen no later than December 17, 1999, provided that the

C0149

Plaintiff has notfiledby such date a motion with this Court to reopen the Receivership
Action, Case No. 960902152.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt by Mr. Jensen of the garnished funds
held by Mr. Blevins, the Plaintiff may obtainfromthe Clerk of the Court the amount of
his undertaking previously deposited with the Court in obtaining the writ of garnishment.

DATED this

|W

day of December 1999.

Judge William B. Bohliri
Third District Court Judg

Approved as to form:

Joseph i.
/Attorney

Custom\Ang!in\Order4_Gamishmcnt December 6,1999
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Tab 6

MICHAEL A. JENSEN (7231)
Attorney at Law
Kearns Building, Suite 300
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-3656
(801) 519-9040; Fax: 519-9264

TWrd Judicial Dtetr"*

FEB 0 9 2GQ0
S^T LAKE COUNTY/

Counsel for Intervener
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 South State Street
PO Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-1860
Third District Clerk: 238-7480; In-Court Clerk: 238-7507/7027 (Melba/Brandi) W42

FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

MARKANGLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CONTRACTING FABRICATION
MACHINING, INC. aka CFM, INC.,

Case No. 990911095
Judge William B. Bohling

Defendant.

The Court, having reviewed the motions by Custom Steel Fabrication, Inc., the
Intervener, and having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the Plaintiff and the
Intervener, and after oral argument by the parties at hearing on January 31, 2000, wherein
the Plaintiff was represented by his counsel of record, Joseph J. Huggins, and the
Intervener was represented by its counsel of record, Michael A. Jensen, the Court grants
the motion to dismiss with prejudice, grants the motion for findings of fact and
conclusions of law as submitted by the Intervener, and denies the motion for attorney's
fees and enters the following conclusions of law and final order and judgment:

001

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Intervener is not a "party" that is eligible for attorney's fees as provided by
§ 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann.
2.

Although the Intervener was successful in defeating the Plaintiffs request for

garnishment of funds held by a third-party, Steven C. Blevins, and although those funds
were turned over to the Intervener's counsel of record by order of this Court, such
success is not equivalent to prevailing as required by § 78-27-56.5, Utah Code Ann.

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
1.

This action be and is dismissed with prejudice;

2.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by the Intervener be

entered in addition to the above Conclusions of Law; and
3.

No attorney's be awarded to any party or to the Intervener.

DATED this

a

day of February 2000.

Judge William B
Third District Court

Approved as to form:

Joseph J. Huggins
Attorney for the Plaintiff
Custom\Anglin\Order4_Garnishment December 6, 1999
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